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The enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
1
(PPACA) was an incomplete victory and will remain so even if the
new Republican congressional majority does not curtail its provisions.
The legislation has many shortcomings and compromises. Most importantly, it could have brought help sooner to millions of uninsured
or under-insured Americans.
Despite these compromises, public health researchers and practi2
tioners have reason to celebrate. Simply put, PPACA fundamentally
altered and improved the public health infrastructure of the United
States. Fully implemented, PPACA promises to markedly improve
clinical preventive services and transform our nation’s response to
traditional centerpiece public health concerns, including HIV/AIDS,
substance abuse, mental health disorders, and other conditions.
†

Helen Ross Professor of Social Service Administration and faculty chair of the
Center for Health Administration Studies, University of Chicago.
1
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
2
See Harold A. Pollack, Prevention and Public Health, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y &
LAW (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author) (describing improvements that PPACA makes to the U.S. public health system).
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In this Article, I note several ways in which provisions of PPACA
3
promise to improve population health. But this Article is less sanguine regarding the politics of public health. I submitted the first draft
in early January 2011, the very week PPACA’s opponents assumed the
4
majority in the House of Representatives. The Speaker of the House
5
has vowed to repeal PPACA, and twenty-six states support constitutional challenges to the individual mandate, a central pillar of the new
6
law. PPACA’s ultimate success depends on the executive branch’s
ability to implement successfully one of the most complex policy reforms in American history against a backdrop of fiscal constraint and
7
partisan acrimony.
8
As a sometime participant and advocate in this process, I am
struck in hindsight that the bill’s fervent defenders did not focus more
explicitly or effectively on these political matters in crafting the final
bill. Many commentators noted that key provisions of PPACA would
likely become politically impregnable once they became part of the
9
fabric of American life. On many of these provisions, PPACA proponents had less success in structuring the Act to ensure that these pro10
visions would achieve such an embedded status.
3

I do not address some other ways PPACA improves public health infrastructure,
such as investments in the medical workforce and Federally Qualified Health Centers.
For a discussion of these issues, see Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Restoring Health to Health
Reform: Integrating Medicine and Public Health to Advance the Population’s Well-Being, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 1777 (2011).
4
See Carl Hulse, Taking Control, G.O.P. Overhauls Rules in House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2011, at A1 (“Jubilant Republicans took control of the House on [January 5, 2011] and
installed Representative John A. Boehner of Ohio as the new speaker . . . .”).
5
Id.
6
See Kevin Sack, Second Judge Deals Blow to Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
2011, at A1 (noting that twenty-six states joined a suit challenging PPACA, six of which
joined after the Republican party took control of those states’ governments).
7
See Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer, The War Isn’t Over, 362 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1259, 1260-61 (2010) (detailing anticipated difficulties in implementing PPACA,
such as information exchanges between state and federal agencies).
8
See, e.g., Harold A. Pollack, The Ride of a Lifetime, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 23, 2010,
4:53 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-treatment/the-ride-lifetime (commenting on
my experience working for health reform).
9
See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, You Thought Passing Health Reform Was Hard? Try Repealing
It, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 2, 2010, 11:46 AM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/
79584/repeal-health-reform-difficult-1099 (describing the immense difficulty of repealing provisions of the statute).
10
See Aaron & Reischauer, supra note 7, at 1259 (“Given the intensity of Republicans’ opposition to the substance and manner of passage of this reform, if the GOP
regains the presidency and control of Congress in 2012, implementation could be
substantially delayed or the law could be . . . repealed before its major elements have
been implemented.”).
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Perceptive PPACA supporters certainly understood from the start
that back-loading implementation was a fundamental political prob11
lem. Executive branch and congressional advocates, along with outside activists, worked hard to win passage of the best possible bill consistent with political constraints. However, supporters appear to have
been less effective in considering how PPACA might be optimally
structured to withstand likely attack should its critics win an emboldening majority. As a result, the reformers missed opportunities to
enact and defend effective public health policies.
12

I. PUBLIC HEALTH GAINS IN HEALTH REFORM

The contributions of PPACA to population health are easily overlooked. PPACA, like most health policy legislation, was not primarily
13
designed to address public health services or public health concerns.
In this, the bill reflected the unbalanced political economy of American health care, which devotes a disproportionate share of public and
private resources and political attention to personal medical services
14
and tertiary care. Although elected officials across the ideological
15
spectrum cite the importance of public health, public health investments often fare poorly in legislative bargaining over scarce resources.
Moreover, many analysts who recognize the centrality of social
determinants of health argue that expanded access to medical services is likely to have minimal impact on population health. Distinguished health economists Dana Goldman and Darius Lakdawalla argue with particular force that PPACA may be overpromising health
improvement:
11

Paul Starr, The Next Health-Reform Campaign, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 2010, at A3,
A5-A6 (outlining PPACA’s vulnerability to political obstacles to implementation).
12
This Part is an expanded and modified version of my article on the improvements to U.S. public health resulting from PPACA. See Pollack, supra note 2.
13
See Gostin et al., supra note 3, at 1766-1767 (arguing that PPACA is not focused
on public health, and providing suggestions for how it could achieve greater public
health at a lower cost).
14
See Paula M. Lantz et al., Health Policy Approaches to Population Health: The Limits
of Medicalization, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1253, 1256 (2007) (noting that health policy usually
focuses on expanding access to personal medical services to the exclusion of expanding access to other services that affect an individual’s health).
15
For example, Senator John McCain’s 2008 campaign platform supported creating
public health infrastructure, such as smoking-cessation programs. See Straight Talk on
Health System Reform, JOHN MCCAIN 2008 (Oct. 17, 2007), http://replay.web.archive.org/
20081219070603/http://www.johnmccain.com/content/default.aspx?guid=8475c713-a5
41-4b97-a2aa-800e35da37bb (accessed by entering the McCain campaign’s website address in the Internet Archive index).
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Advocates of universal coverage often get confused on this point.
They equate good health with having health insurance, and cite myriad
academic studies. The problem is that these studies don’t account for all
the other differences between the insured and uninsured—what they
eat, where they live, whether they smoke or drink, the amount of stress
in their lives, and even their genetic predisposition to disease. No
healthcare system is good enough to fully compensate for bad behavior
and poor environmental factors.
Perhaps the strongest and earliest such evidence came from the
RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), which randomly assigned
families to health insurance plans of varying generosity. One of the
main findings of this experiment was that families in the least generous
plan (95 percent coinsurance) spent nearly 30 percent less on medical
16
care—with little or no difference in their health.

These authors do not identify specific advocates who equate good
health with having health insurance, or who deny the importance of
behavioral or environmental risk factors. As a result, it is unclear how
many advocates of universal coverage are actually confused or naïve
on these basic points.
Still, the authors’ point is well-taken. Health insurance coverage
does not address many threats to individual and population health.
Balanced policies must attend to social determinants of health—
education, housing, accidents and violence, public safety, workplace
safety, environmental protection—as well as to reducing barriers to
personal medical services. Social policy is health policy in each of
17
these areas.
Health policy researchers are increasingly aware of the dangers in
overstating the link between insurance and health. At the same time, it
is tempting to misapply social epidemiology to wrongly dismiss the importance of expanded health coverage. There is substantial evidence,
much of it compiled in the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE),
that expanded access to care improves health outcomes, particularly in
18
patients with cardiovascular risk-factors and hypertension.
16

Dana P. Goldman & Darius N. Lakdawalla, Can the ACA Improve Population
Health?, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, no. 5, art. 4, 2010, at 1, 1-2, http://www.bepress.com/ev/
vol7/iss5/art4.
17
See ROBERT F. SCHOENI ET AL., MAKING AMERICANS HEALTHIER: SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC POLICY AS HEALTH POLICY 3-23 (2008) (considering the general health
effects of social economic policy); Lantz, supra note 14, at 1254 (describing the need to
incorporate social policy into health policy considerations).
18
See, e.g., Emmett B. Keeler et al., How Free Care Reduced Hypertension in the Health
Insurance Experiment, 254 JAMA 1926, 1926 (1985) (finding that hypertensives with free
care had more visits with their physicians, which led to higher rates of diagnoses).
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The experiment was too short to directly investigate mortality dif19
ferences across the different treatment plans. However, study investigators were able to explore statistical models of human mortality attri20
Within these analyses,
butable to basic measurable risk factors.
low-income HIE participants enrolled in high-deductible plans displayed notably higher predicted mortality than did their otherwise
21
comparable peers enrolled in a free care plan.
Almost all of the predicted mortality reduction reflected improved
22
hypertension detection and treatment. Subsequent studies support
23
these findings. Goldman and Lakdawalla themselves note that “poor
people with high blood pressure had slightly higher [predicted]
mortality rates” when assigned to high-deductible rather than free
24
health care plans.
As these studies demonstrate, health insurance coverage facilitates
the receipt of basic health services, which in turn enables primary care
providers or others to detect hypertension and to provide accompanying treatment through inexpensive medications. Access to such care
rarely produces large changes in health behavior or in social determi25
nants of health, but it does give individuals access to basic, effective
treatments that improve health and prolong life.
Using nationally representative longitudinal data from the Health
and Retirement Study, J. Michael McWilliams and colleagues found
substantially higher eight-year mortality rates among uninsured individuals ages fifty-five to sixty-four than among facially similar insured
26
peers. Mortality differences were especially stark within the lowest
19

JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & THE INS. EXPERIMENT GROUP, FREE FOR
FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 204 (1993).
20

ALL? LESSONS

Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 211 tbl.6.13.
22
See Robert H. Brook et al., Does Free Care Improve Adults’ Health? Results from a
Randomized Controlled Trial, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1426, 1429-33 (1983) (finding that
free care benefits those with “specific conditions,” such as hypertension, and is likely to
lower their mortality risk).
23
See, e.g., Joseph D. Freeman et al., The Causal Effect of Health Insurance on Utilization and Outcomes in Adults: A Systematic Review of U.S. Studies, 46 MED. CARE 1023, 1030
(2008) (summarizing studies indicating that insurance is associated with decreased
mortality rates).
24
Goldman & Lakdawalla, supra note 16, at 2.
25
See E.B. Keeler et al., Effects of Cost Sharing on Physiological Health, Health Practices,
and Worry, 6 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 279, 302-03 (1987) (finding that increased access
to free care does little to create better health habits).
26
J. Michael McWilliams et al., Health Insurance Coverage and Mortality Among the
Near-Elderly, 23 HEALTH AFF. 223, 228 exhibit 2 (2004) (reporting a three to five
percent difference in mortality rates).
21
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quartile of household income as well as among adults with diabetes,
27
hypertension, or heart disease. Mortality hazard rates among the uninsured were more than fifty percent higher than those observed
among the insured in both the low-income and the cardiovascu28
lar-illness groups.
Given the non-experimental nature of these analyses, it is possible
that unobserved factors account for the observed mortality differences. Yet the authors conducted sensitivity analyses which suggest that
complete confounding is unlikely:
[A]n unobserved factor similar to smoking in prevalence (approximately
25 percent of the study cohort) and its association with insurance status
(relative risk of being uninsured equal to 1.66) would have to be associated with a relative eight-year mortality risk of 2.65 for the association
between insurance status and mortality to become non-significant when
further adjusted for this unobserved factor. In comparison, smoking was
29
associated with a relative eight-year mortality risk of 2.48.

Medicare studies provide further support for the causal importance of health coverage. In a series of other studies, the same researchers documented improvement in many health measures when
individuals reached the age of Medicare eligibility, along with surpri30
singly large reductions in racial, ethnic and educational disparities.
Racial disparities in systolic blood pressure decreased by approximate31
ly sixty percent. Educational, racial, and ethnic disparities in blood
32
glucose control decreased by more than seventy-five percent. Educa33
tional disparities in total cholesterol levels became negligible. Receipt of key preventive services, such as mammography and prostate

27

See id. at 229 exhibit 4 (demonstrating a difference of approximately six percent
between insured and uninsured individuals).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 228-29.
30
See, e.g., J. Michael McWilliams, Health Consequences of Uninsurance among Adults
in the United States: Recent Evidence and Implications, 87 MILBANK Q. 443, 470 (2009); J.
Michael McWilliams et al., Health of Previously Uninsured Adults After Acquiring Medicare
Coverage, 298 JAMA 2886, 2892 (2007); J. Michael McWilliams et al., Impact of Medicare
Coverage on Basic Clinical Services for Previously Uninsured Adults, 290 JAMA 757, 761
(2003) [hereinafter McWilliams et al., Impact of Medicare Coverage]; J. Michael McWilliams et al., Use of Health Services by Previously Uninsured Medicare Beneficiaries, 357 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 143, 149-50 (2007).
31
J. Michael McWilliams et al., Differences in Control of Cardiovascular Disease and Diabetes by Race, Ethnicity, and Education: U.S. Trends from 1999 to 2006 and Effects of Medicare Coverage, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 505, 512 fig.3 (2009).
32
Id. at 511 fig.2.
33
Id. at 512 fig.3.
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cancer screening, also sharply increased at age sixty-five among the
34
previously uninsured.
Expanded Medicaid eligibility is an especially important institu35
tional shift. Although expanded Medicaid is usually discussed as a
vehicle to reduce the number of uninsured, it has particular implications for the patchwork of providers and services in safety-net care.
Medicaid is currently a means-tested categorical program which
only covers certain types of low-income individuals—for example,
children under the federal poverty level, or those who are eligible for
specific programs such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
36
(TANF) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Many poor work37
ing parents or single adults are not eligible for Medicaid. In particular, unattached adults who are drug-dependent or HIV-infected are
38
often ineligible. These individuals, therefore, rely on a patchwork
of safety-net providers to finance substance-abuse treatment and oth39
er essential services.
By 2014, PPACA will extend Medicaid eligibility to every American
40
with a household income below 133% of the poverty line. These
individuals will gain access to the full apparatus of Medicaid-funded
services for their primary conditions, while their providers will gain
access to more generous and secure funding. They will also have Medicaid coverage to treat the physical and psychiatric co-morbidities that
now often go unaddressed.
This change will require significant adjustments within both the
public and private sectors. Existing federal programs such as the Ryan
White CARE Act and the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment

34

McWilliams et al., Impact of Medicare Coverage, supra note 30, at 761 tbl.2.
See ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY
CHANGES ARE ENACTED 163-67 (2008) (discussing institutional change as a mechanism
for sustained policy reform).
36
See INST. OF MED., PUBLIC FINANCING AND DELIVERY OF HIV/AIDS CARE: SECURING THE LEGACY OF RYAN WHITE 109-17 (2001) (describing barriers to eligibility and
the special programs that provide coverage).
37
Id. at 109.
38
See id. (noting that many needy, working individuals earn incomes above the
Medicaid eligibility level).
39
Id.
40
KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., OPTIMIZING MEDICAID ENROLLMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON STRENGTHENING MEDICAID’S REACH
UNDER HEALTH CARE REFORM 3 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/
upload/8068.pdf.
35
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41

Block Grant must be redesigned for an era of near-universal coverage.
Moreover, traditional providers such as methadone clinics will face new
competition from Federally Qualified Health Centers and accountablecare organizations, which have new incentives and resources to expand
42
their reach into mental and behavioral health services.
PPACA also enhances the financing of clinical preventive services
by requiring insurers to reimburse evidence-based preventive services
without patient cost-sharing. In particular, insurers will be required
to cover services that either have received an “A” or “B” rating from
the United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF), or that
are supported by other selected public health guidelines released by
43
federal agencies.
The USPSTF attracted controversy when it declined to endorse
routine mammography screening for women in their forties, leading
many citizens and advocacy groups to argue that these provisions of
44
PPACA will be used to ration care. The more important change is to
ensure that evidence-informed services are fully covered for popula45
tions in which there is documented need. Many of these services focus on politically marginalized or obscure populations that have important yet unmet needs.
Finally, PPACA establishes a Prevention and Public Health Fund
46
to support preventive services and public health infrastructure. The
41

See, e.g., Harold Pollack, Progress on HIV, but Will It Last?, NEW REPUBLIC (July 16,
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/76312/progress-hiv-will-it-last
(noting that PPACA will have an enormous impact on long-standing federal programs,
many of which will need to be modified as a result).
42
See Harold Pollack, Rehab: America’s Drug Policies Just Got a Whole Lot Better, NEW
REPUBLIC (May 14, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/rehab (discussing federally funded addiction-treatment services affected by PPACA).
43
PPACA sec. 1001, § 2713, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13 (West Supp. 1A 2010); see also
Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Preventive Services, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 15, 2010,
11:48
AM),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/07/15/implementing-health-reformpreventive-services (summarizing some of the requirements of section 1001).
44
See Eric M. Patashnik & Alan S. Gerber, Problem Solving in a Polarized Age: Comparative Effectiveness Research and the Politicization of Evidence-Based Medicine, THE FORUM
no. 1, art. 3, 2010, at 7, 7, n.1, http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol8/iss1/art3 (“The
Obama Administration responded to the public outcry . . . by promising that
government insurance programs would continue to cover mammograms for women
starting at age 40.”).
45
See U.S. Preventive Services Task Force Recommendations, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://
www.healthcare.gov/center/regulations/prevention/taskforce.html (last visited Mar.
15, 2011) (listing various types of preventive actions and the populations that would
benefit the most from them).
46
PPACA § 4002, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300u-11; see also Public Health Provisions of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, PUB. HEALTH L. NETWORK, http://
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Fund will allocate approximately $15 billion over the next decade.
Funded activities include diabetes, HIV, and violence prevention; infrastructure development of epidemiological surveillance systems;
and case-finding for sexually-transmitted infections, tobacco control,
48
obesity and more.
In some areas, such as smoking cessation, a wide range of evidence49
based programs are available. In others, such as obesity prevention,
50
the field is at an earlier, more tentative point.
II. THE POLITICAL CHALLENGE
Each of the above public health provisions promises to be an important substantive accomplishment. Each is also potentially threatened by the changed legislative landscape, by political vulnerabilities
created by the design of the new law, and by the state and local fiscal
crisis. PPACA was carefully crafted, from a political perspective, to win
51
legislative enactment. Its backers also carefully crafted its provisions
to maximize the chances that it would eventually become part of the
52
fabric of American political life.
The fact that PPACA was passed at all represented a historic accomplishment—one that testifies to the determination and political
skills of its backers. Yet its backers now face a more immediate challenge: implementing, preserving, and defending a relatively unpopular bill in the face of a hostile congressional majority.
www.publichealthlawnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/ACA-chart-formatted-FINAL2.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (noting that PPACA section 4001 establishes the Prevention
and Public Health Fund).
47
PUB. HEALTH L. NETWORK, supra note 46.
48
See Georges Benjamin & Larry Cohen, The Prevention and Public Health Fund:
Good for Our Health, Good for Small Business, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sep. 13, 2010),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/2010/September/091310benjamincohen.
aspx (describing the benefits likely to result from the Fund’s screening programs).
49
See Michael C. Fiore, A Clinical Practice Guideline for Treating Tobacco Use and Dependence: A US Public Health Service Report, 283 JAMA 3244, 3244 (2000) (providing an
“evidence-based, updated guideline” with “specific recommendations regarding brief
and intensive tobacco cessation interventions”).
50
See John Cawley, The Cost-Effectiveness of Programs to Prevent or Reduce Obesity: The
State of the Literature and a Future Research Agenda, 161 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 611, 612 (2007) (“[T]he research literature [regarding obesity] is still at
the earlier stage of determining whether specific interventions work at all.”).
51
Mark A. Peterson, It Was a Different Time: Obama and the Unique Opportunity for
Health Care Reform, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 429, 435-36 (forthcoming June 2011)
(describing the strategic choices leading led to PPACA’s successful passage).
52
See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 9 (noting that PPACA’s provisions are difficult to repeal because of the financial costs involved).
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Had they foreseen the outcome of the 2010 election, PPACA supporters might have fashioned this legislation rather differently. Of
course, hindsight offers greater clarity than can be expected in the
moment. But some political challenges and strategic missteps could
have been readily anticipated based on the history of other reforms.
Eric Patashnik’s Reforms at Risk provides an especially valuable
53
framework to explore these questions. Patashnik examines the political feasibility of “general-interest reforms” that provide broadreaching social value but which may not advance the interests of spe54
cific constituencies. Some general-interest reforms, such as airline
55
deregulation, endure. Others, such as the 1986 tax reform, were
56
passed with great fanfare but then gradually unraveled.
Patashnik anticipated one fundamental political concern facing
supporters of health reform: its back-loaded implementation. As Patashnik argues, “It takes time for reforms to embed themselves in governing routines, but time is a luxury reform advocates may not
57
have.” Moreover, Patashnik adds, “Reforms endure not because they
are ‘frozen in place’ . . . . Rather, they endure because they reconfi58
gure the political dynamic.”
As previously noted, the fact that key provisions will not be operational until 2014 or later is the greatest and most obvious shortcoming of the health reform. Its key features may eventually reconfigure
the political dynamic surrounding health insurance and health policy. Yet many of the most important political and policy outcomes will
be determined before this occurs. PPACA was enacted in March 2010,
and the 2010 and 2012 elections—and in some cases the 2014 or later elections—will occur before its most costly and important ele59
ments take force.
In the meantime, states and localities are experiencing profound
fiscal retrenchment, with an accompanying retrenchment of public
53

PATASHNIK, supra note 35.
Id. at 155.
55
See id. at 133 (contending that airline deregulation has been a long-lasting
policy because important private parties adapted to the reform instead of trying to
drive reform).
56
See id. at 54 (noting that, from the beginning, commentators “warned that reform
might not stick” because the act did not force any actors to change their behavior).
57
Id. at 155.
58
Id. (emphasis omitted).
59
See Henry J. Aaron, The Midterm Elections—--High Stakes for Health Policy, 363 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1685, 1687 (2010) (“Since most major provisions of the [PP]ACA do not
take effect until January 1, 2014, delaying tactics might eventually enable repeal.”).
54
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60

health efforts. Thousands of public health workers have been laid off
over the past two years and many health departments have reduced
61
services, despite growing needs for those services. Retrenchment may
worsen as states and localities experience continued fiscal difficulties.
PPACA does little to address these losses directly. Moreover, proper
implementation of PPACA depends at many points upon state lawmakers’ skills, resources, and desire to cooperate with federal authorities.
It is unclear whether these state budget challenges politically help
or hinder PPACA’s implementation. Governors fear that it will im62
pose additional costs through Medicaid and other programs. However, PPACA also makes available additional resources for Federally
Qualified Health Centers, workforce training, and other activities of
63
great value to cash-strapped states.
PPACA is also vulnerable because key provisions rely upon the ap64
propriation decisions of future Congresses.
The Prevention and
Public Health Fund may be the single most vulnerable item:
One aide said health reform’s preventive health spending is one of the
“top three” offsets in the law that congressional Republican staffers are
eyeing, with the idea that a few moderate Democrats facing tough races
in 2012 could eventually be brought on board. . . . Republicans have
long derided the multibillion Prevention and Public Health Fund as
wasteful spending, scoffing at its investment in bike paths and farmers’
markets. One Republican Senate aide quipped that it was a “slush fund
65
for jungle gyms.”

60

See, e.g., Julie Appleby, Groups Vie for a Piece of Health Law’s $15 Billion Prevention
Fund, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 7, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/
2010/May/08/prevention-money-fight-health-reform-law.aspx (“Eighty-five percent of
health departments surveyed by association[s] of health officials say they have reduced
services since July 2008, often because of state budget shortfalls.”).
61
See LHD Budget Cuts and Job Losses, NACCHO, http://www.naccho.org/topics/
infrastructure/lhdbudget/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (reporting that
roughly 29,000 local health jobs were lost from January 2008 to December 2010).
62
See Harold Pollack, Forget About Boehner. Try Republican Governors, NEW REPUBLIC
(Oct. 29, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/78760/healthcare-obama-congress-republican-governors (noting that some governors have expressed concerns about how to finance PPACA’s mandated programs and arguing that
those governors may provide valuable political support for the Act in return for financial aid for those programs).
63
See id. (noting that PPACA “expands funding for community health centers. . . . [that] also provide thousands of jobs.”).
64
See generally PATASHNIK, supra note 35, at 155 (arguing that reforms often fail because future governmental actors lack the same vision as those who enacted the reform).
65
Sarah Kliff, Doc Fix New Weapon vs. Health Reform, POLITICO (Dec. 5, 2010, 5:09
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/45976.html.
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Republicans have proposed to zero out the Prevention and Public
Health Fund in two legislative battles: the first is a proposed
amendment by Nebraska Republican Senator Mike Johanns to re66
peal a small-business tax reporting requirement, and the second is
a proposed measure to finance one year of Medicare’s proposed
67
“doctor fix.”
At first glance, the fund’s political predicament is rooted in ideological disagreement about the value of preventive services, fraught
with problematic symbolism evocative of such past efforts as “midnight
68
basketball” for urban youth. Some fund activities concern HIV prevention and reproductive health services that have traditionally
69
attracted congressional concern.
Yet the Fund’s fundamental difficulty is that it rests on a simple appropriation, which can be readily eliminated or cut by congressional
majorities that oppose specific program activities or that simply wish to
reallocate $15 billion to other purposes in a constrained fiscal environment. Although the Fund provides money for valued services, it was not
structured to maximize its likelihood of survival in unfavorable political
conditions. These portions of PPACA did not create institutional
changes or legal obligations that would raise the costs of future budget
cuts. Individuals receiving Fund-financed services have no specific legal
right to continued benefits. States that administer Fund-financed programs have no similar continued legal claim to federal monies.
Ironically, the Fund might have stronger political prospects if it
were a “slush fund” for specific constituencies. Unlike programs to
promote agricultural subsidies, specific weapons systems, small business owners, home mortgages, health coverage, or higher education,
the Fund is not structured to serve or cultivate concentrated constituencies who could then lobby for continued appropriations.
66

See Harold Pollack, For THIS Congress Might Defund Public Health?, NEW REPUBLIC
(Sept. 12, 2010, 8:31 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/77604/republicanstax-evasion (describing Senator Johanns’s proposal to eliminate the Prevention and
Public Health Fund in order to fund a tax measure).
67
See Kliff, supra note 65 (discussing Republicans’ use of the Medicare “doc fix”
to take funding from health reform).
68
Darren Wheelock & Doug Hartmann, Midnight Basketball and the 1994 Crime Bill
Debates: The Operation of a Racial Code, 48 SOC. Q. 315, 316 (2007) (describing interestgroup agitation that led to the evisceration of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994).
69
See Nancy Folbre, Sex and the Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Feb. 5, 2009,
4:16 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/sex-and-the-stimulus (describing opposition from many quarters to a family planning funding element in a
stimulus package).
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Almost by definition, the Fund serves critical, frequently disorganized, and politically marginal constituencies. Consumers of smokingcessation quit lines, or individuals requiring treatment and screening
for sexually transmitted infection or substance abuse, for example, are
poorly positioned to advocate for their programs. But the Fund does
have a strong ideological constituency within the public health community. Given the perceived alignment between the public health
70
community and politically liberal causes, such advocacy may be more
effective when Democrats rather than Republicans are politically ascendant in Congress.
Other PPACA provisions face political risks due to poor program
design. As noted above, Nebraska Senator Mike Johanns sought unsuccessfully to defund the Prevention and Public Health Fund to
71
finance repeal of a tax compliance measure included in PPACA.
That PPACA provision required small businesses to file 1099 income
72
tax forms for a range of additional transactions exceeding $600. In
the aftermath of PPACA’s passage, lawmakers received intense lobbying from representatives of small businesses who found this provision
73
to impose unreasonable burdens.
Republicans sought to eliminate this provision entirely, while
Democrats sought to exempt purchases of less than $5000 (and firms
74
employing less than twenty-five people) from the new requirement.
Although Democrats assembled fifty-six Senate votes for their pre75
ferred modification, they could not assemble a cloture-proof majority.
Thus, the original unpopular tax provision remains settled law,
leading to great anger within the key constituency of small-business
owners directed towards PPACA. The vast unpopularity of this measure provides critics with little political incentive to help the Obama
administration or congressional Democrats correct its technical de-

70

See SALLY SATEL, PC, M.D.: HOW POLITICAL CORRECTNESS IS CORRUPTING MED17 (2001) (arguing that public health has moved away from finding scientific
means for disease prevention towards social justice advocacy).
71
See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Ezra Klein, Senate Fails
Small-Business Owners on 1099 Reform, WASH. POST BLOG (Sept. 14, 2010, 1:26 PM), http://
voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/09/the_senate_fails_small_business.html
(noting the failure of Senator Johanns’s proposal).
72
Id.
73
See, e.g., Bob Graboyes, 1099 Collation Calamity, NFIB HEALTHCARE BULL. (Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus., Nashville, Tenn), Aug. 10, 2010, at 11 (arguing forcefully that
PPACA would “drown[] small business under an ocean of IRS Form 1099s”).
74
Klein, supra note 71 (describing the Senate’s failed attempt to amend PPACA).
75
Id.

ICINE
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fects. Indeed the National Federation of Independent Business and
others have made “the 1099 Collation Calamity” a centerpiece of an
76
effective anti-PPACA political campaign. The Wall Street Journal editorialized in favor of NFIB’s position, making no mention of Democrats’
77
attempted, but filibustered, fix.
The newly established Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plan
78
(PCIP) provides a second example of a problematic program design
causing broader difficulties. This program allocates $5 billion between 2010 and 2014 to provide health insurance coverage for individuals with pre-existing conditions who lack health insurance cover79
age. PCIP appears to suffer from all three difficulties identified in a
December 2010 analysis by Patashnik and Zelitzer of the political sustainability of policy reforms: “[w]eak policy design, inadequate or
80
conflicting institutional supports, and poor timing.”
81
As I describe in greater detail elsewhere, this program faces serious operational and design challenges. The most serious of these
challenges is the simple fact that available funding appears adequate
to serve less than ten percent of Americans who face the dual chal82
lenge of chronic illness and the lack of health insurance coverage.
Such design defects place these specific programs at risk and
create broader political vulnerabilities for the entire bill. As New York
Times columnist David Brooks asserted in a January 2011 essay:
The health care reform law was signed 10 months ago, and what’s
striking now is how vulnerable it looks. Several threats have emerged—
some of them scarcely discussed before passage—that together or alone
could seriously endanger the new system. These include:
...

76

Graboyes, supra note 73, at 11.
The 1099 Stonewall, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Sept. 20, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748703904304575498071550034964.html (opining that “Democrats slammed the door on a bipartisan attempt to repeal” the 1099 reporting
requirement).
78
See, e.g., Harold A. Pollack, High-Risk Pools for the Sick and Uninsured Under Health
Reform: Too Little and Thus Too Late, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 91, 91-92 (2011).
79
Id.
80
Eric M. Patashnik & Julian E. Zelizer, When Policy Does Not Remake Politics:
The Limits of Policy Feedback 5 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1449996.
81
See Pollack, supra note 78, at 91 (arguing that “[t]o provide adequate health
care for uninsured individuals with chronic diseases, the federal PCIP appropriations
would need to be many times higher . . . .”).
82
See Patashnik & Zelizer, supra note 80, at 5.
77
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False projections. The new system is based on a series of expert projections on how people will behave. In the first test case, these projections
were absurdly off base. According to the Medicare actuary, 375,000
people should have already signed up for the new high-risk pools for the
uninsured, but only 8,000 have.
More seriously, cost projections are way off. For example, New
Hampshire’s plan has only about 80 members, but the state has already
burned through nearly double the $650,000 that the federal government
allotted to help run the program. If other projections are off by this
83
much, the results will be disastrous.

For technical reasons, the design and forecasting problems with
PCIP are less severe than Brooks implied. However, the inherent difficulty of designing and implementing this complex and temporary
program poses many political challenges which might have been
avoided through more carefully crafted provisions in the original bill.
More complex issues have been raised regarding the Community
Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) disability insurance
program. Experts disagree about the actuarial soundness of CLASS’s
current program design, with the Congressional Budget Office taking
84
a more optimistic view than the chief actuary of the Center for Medi85
caid and Medicaid Services (CMS). Should the most serious concerns be borne out, CLASS’s challenges provide another potential
area of political vulnerability for health reform.
III. SUCCESSFUL MODELS OF POLITICALLY SUSTAINABLE
PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURES
Although some public health measures (enacted within PPACA or
other legislation) appear politically vulnerable, others appear likely to
be sustained under both Democratic and Republican majorities.
Tobacco excise taxes may be the most successful public health
measure in terms of cultivating powerful supportive constituencies
83

David Brooks, Opinion, Buckle Up for Round 2, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, at A19.
See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to George
Miller, Chairman, House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, at 1 (Nov. 25, 2009), at 1, available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/doc10769/CLASS_Additional_Information_Miller_
letter.pdf (“For both the House and Senate versions of CLASS, the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimates that the cash flows under the new program would generate
budgetary savings (that is, a reduction in net federal outlays) for the 2010-–2019 period
and for the 10 years following . . . .”).
85
See Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., at 2 (Apr. 22, 2010), available at https://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/
Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf (finding that the CLASS program will generate net
losses every year from 2010-–2019, for a total of $37.8 billion).
84
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over time. The Institute of Medicine and other expert bodies have
86
identified excise taxes as important tools to reduce smoking. These
policies have proven especially sustainable for the obvious reason that
87
they yield valuable revenue at every level of American government.
Between 1995 and 2009, federal cigarette excise taxes increased 321%,
88
while the average state excise tax increased by 267%. These tax increases finance a variety of medical and public health interventions,
ranging from the Children’s Health Insurance Program to smokingcessation quit lines. These revenues are also used to reduce state and
89
local budget deficits or to meet other important social needs.
From a public health perspective, it is ideal when such revenues
finance measures to directly improve population health. The mere
fact that all levels of government depend on these revenues for popular activities helps to sustain these policies politically, even—or especially—during hard economic times when many public health services
90
and expenditures are curbed.
Other public health measures have also proved politically effective. As noted above, PPACA greatly expanded coverage of preventive
91
services that are given high ratings by the USPSTF. Viewed through
the lens of Patashnik’s analysis, this provision’s institutional shift
92
makes it especially politically generative.
USPSTF, a rather marginalized expert body, now has explicit authority in the design and reimbursement of clinical preventive servic86

See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010: MIDCOURSE RE(2010), at 27-7, available at http://www.healthypeople.gov/2010/Data/midcourse/
(describing the successes of Michigan, New Jersey, and Rhode Island in using excise taxes
to combat smoking).
87
See 2009–2010 Proposed State Legislation for Tobacco Tax Increases, NAT’L CONF. ON
STATE LEGIS.), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13862 (last visited Mar. 15,
2011) (listing various states’ expected revenues from tobacco taxes and how those revenues will be distributed across various levels of state government).
88
Federal and State Cigarette Excise Taxes—United States, 1995–2009, 58 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 524, 524 (2009).
89
NAT’L CONF. ON STATE LEGIS., supra note 87.
90
Curiously, the same trend has not applied to alcohol taxes. The real value of
excise taxes on beer and spirits has markedly declined since the 1950s, despite strong
evidence that such taxes are below the levels required for drinkers to internalize fully
the economic costs of alcohol-related harm. See PHILIP J. COOK, PAYING THE TAB: THE
ECONOMICS OF ALCOHOL POLICY 165 (2007) (“[L]ooking back fifty years from 2005,
the federal excise tax on liquor (adjusted for inflation) was 5.7 times as high, and the
excise tax on beer 3.6 times as high.”).
91
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
92
See PATASHNIK, supra note 35, at 155 (discussing how the most enduring reforms
are politically dynamic).
VIEW
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93

es. This immediately fosters improved reimbursement and utilization of specific services that are unlikely to be the target of focused political advocacy, such as chlamydia screening.
Some services, such as Screening, Brief Intervention, and Referral
to Treatment (SBIRT) for alcohol disorders, have been subject to prolonged legislative and regulatory debate. Because these services have
94
earned a “B” rating from USPSTF, they will now be reimbursed.
Other forms of screening yield high marks from USPSTF, yet are often excluded from public or private insurance coverage if they are
proposed under the umbrella of population screening rather than as
clinically indicated diagnostic tests for particular patients.
Over the long term, this provision may prove important in other
ways. USPSTF is acknowledged as a central player in health policy.
Clinicians, researchers, and funders now have much greater incentives
to conduct clinical trials of promising services that might receive favorable USPSTF ratings. Prevention trials financed by the National
Institutes of Health, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and others suddenly
have direct policy relevance if they satisfy USPSTF’s rigorous criteria
for prevention trials.
The full implications of this change remain to be seen, but this
major policy change commands attention. Although USPSTF decisions are occasionally controversial, Congress is less likely to curb
USPSTF’s authority to expand access to clinical services than it is to
approve more expansive coverage of specific popular services that fail
to pass USPSTF muster, such as mammography for young women who
95
have no indicated risk factors.
Other regulatory elements of PPACA are also politically generative. The language specifying health insurance exchanges provides
significant protections for individuals with mental health and substance abuse disorders. By including these disorders in the language
governing medical homes, PPACA encourages Federally Qualified
Health Centers, as well as other kinds of organizations, including the
Mayo Clinic, to address concerns that have traditionally been viewed
within the province of safety-net care.
93

PPACA, sec. 1001, § 2713, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13 (West Supp. 1A 2010).
See U.S. Preventive Servs. Task Force, Screening and Behavioral Counseling Interventions in Primary Care to Reduce Alcohol Misuse: Recommendation Statement, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 554, 554 (2004).
95
U.S. Preventive Servs. Task Force, Screening for Breast Cancer: U.S. Preventive Services Task Force Recommendation Statement, 151 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 716, 716 (2009).
94
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IV. DESIGNING MORE SUSTAINABLE PUBLIC HEALTH POLICIES
The legislative and implementation battles that surround PPACA
challenge public health activists, researchers, and practitioners to construct more durable policies. Sustainable policies must nurture the
conditions for future political success. Such policies are politically
generative when they attract new political allies and friendly interest
groups, or when they create lasting institutional shifts that favor continued public health investment.
In tangible ways, PPACA might have been designed to be more
robust in the face of a hostile majority. PCIP provides an egregious
example. Although this program builds on traditional Republican
proposals and is ideologically moderate, its cumbersome program design, combined with its low level of funding, makes it unlikely to win
strong political support. PCIP’s avowedly temporary structure gives
potential allies especially little reason to embrace it or to expend political capital on its behalf.
Other strategies were available that provided simpler and more
politically sustainable models to more quickly help the medically uninsured. Early in the health reform process, Senator Max Baucus
proposed shortening the required Medicare waiting period for indi96
viduals deemed eligible for federal disability programs. Several hundred thousand uninsured individuals with disabling conditions now
endure this waiting period and could be helped through modifying
97
the program rules.
Expanding Medicare eligibility to this group represented a more
administratively feasible change that could have quickly mobilized an
organized constituency within the disability community. Moreover,
the government could initiate this program through an expansion of
the Medicare entitlement that would be difficult for future legislators
to repeal and that would not require explicit appropriations from a
future Congress. Ironically, the key drawback of this policy change is
financial. Complete elimination of the Medicare waiting period

96

MAX BAUCUS, CALL TO ACTION: HEALTH REFORM 2009, at 14 (2008).
Id. at 22; see also STACY BERG DALE & JAMES M. VERDIER, COMMONWEALTH FUND,
ELIMINATION OF MEDICARE’S WAITING PERIOD FOR SERIOUSLY DISABLED ADULTS: IMPACT
ON COVERAGE AND COSTS 1 (2003), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
usr_doc/660_Dale_elimination.pdf (estimating that disabled individuals’ two-year waiting period affected about 1.26 million people as of January 2002).
97
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would require much greater federal expenditures than are now being
98
provided through PCIP.
There are sometimes real tensions between good politics and
good substantive policy. The Prevention and Public Health Fund
might have better political prospects if it had a broader circle of constituencies outside the traditional public health community with a
vested interest in its survival. For example, Democratic and Republican governors would have a greater stake in continued appropriations
if fund resources were explicitly provided through state governments.
Such shared state-federal ownership brings a real price. Some
governors may oppose evidence-based interventions such as a syringe
99
exchange. Others may demonstrate corresponding enthusiasm for
popular programs such as abstinence-only education that lack demon100
strated effectiveness. Centralized federal control would likely focus
resources more effectively on evidence-based public health interventions. When the executive branch and congressional majorities are
strongly committed to public health, such centralized authority has
many advantages. Under less favorable political conditions, however,
such shared ownership may be more sustainable. Although some ineffective programs are likely to receive funding, overall public health
funding might be greater and more secure.
PPACA also could have been structured more imaginatively to
support state and local public health infrastructure. For example, local health departments can receive Medicaid reimbursement for pre101
natal care, HIV treatment, and other clinical services. They cannot
bill Medicaid for equally important services such as epidemiological
102
Expanding the scope
case-finding or partner-notification services.
98

Compare figures from DALE & VERDIER, supra note 97, at 2, which estimate that
the change would cost approximately $8.7 billion annually, with those discussed by Pollack, supra note 78, at 91, which note that PPACA provides $5 billion for PCIP funding
between 2010 and 2014.
99
See INST. OF MED., NO TIME TO LOSE: GETTING MORE FROM HIV PREVENTION
114-16 (Monica S. Ruiz et al. eds., 2001) (discussing political barriers to needle exchange
programs).
100
See CHRISTOPHER TRENHOLM ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC.,
IMPACTS OF FOUR TITLE V, SECTION 510 ABSTINENCE EDUCATION PROGRAMS 59 (2007)
(finding that abstinence education programs have no impact on rates of sexual
abstinence).
101
See Email from Sherry Glied, Assistant Sec’y for Planning & Educ., Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., to author (Oct. 4, 2010) (on file with author) (describing the
types of preventative services for which PPACA provides funding).
102
See id. (explaining that these types of services are generally not billable to Medicaid under PPACA).
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of Medicaid reimbursement to include a greater range of public
health services would provide valuable financial assistance to state and
local governments. It would also allow the federal government to
more effectively promote and nurture vulnerable services that enhance population health.
The political science literature offers one more sobering lesson in
formulating politically sustainable policy. Many within the public
health community seek to address a central political challenge: crafting
persuasive messages to convince voters and policymakers of the value of
103
preventive services and measures that improve population health.
The good news is that the American public embraces the value of public health as a general policy goal. In a November 2009 survey, seventyone percent of registered voters polled indicated that they support increased investments in prevention “to help people stay healthy and
104
reduce diseases such as diabetes, cancer and heart disease.”
The bad news is that such generalized public support means much
less than one might hope. In the first place, public opinion regarding
public health can markedly shift when the underlying policy issues are
105
linked with broader partisan and ideological disputes.
More fundamentally, the history of general-interest reforms suggests that such
favorable polls are far less important to political outcomes than one
106
might suppose.
Sustainable public health policy requires more than the passive
support or the momentary acquiescence of a political majority. One
must design policies to nurture the loyalties and investments of specific interest groups and constituencies who have reason to support and
defend these new policies. One must create organizational changes
that are difficult, costly, or unattractive for future majorities to undo.
103

Robert J. Blendon et al., Americans’ Conflicting Views About the Public Health System, and How to Shore Up Support, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2033, 2038 (2010) (noting that to
continue to provide support for health care, Americans will want to see examples of
successful programs).
104
GREENBERG QUINLA, ROSNER RESEARCH & PUB. OPINION STRATEGIES, AMERICAN PUBLIC SUPPORTS INVESTMENT IN PREVENTION AS PART OF HEALTH CARE REFORM:
SOLID MAJORITIES FAVOR TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH’S PROPOSALS 2 (2009), available at http://www.greenbergresearch.com/index.php?ID=2416.
105
See Sarah E. Gollust et al., The Polarizing Effect of News Media Messages About the
Social Determinants of Health, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2160, 2165 (2009) (finding that
Republicans’ and Democrats’ opinions on health care can diverge even when exposed
to neutral social determinants messages).
106
See generally PATASHNIK, supra note 35, at 155-71 (noting that popularity at the
time of enactment has little to do with a reform’s sustainability and discussing the factors that do impact the long-term survival of reforms).
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Political durability is no guarantee of policy success. Yet good policy that rests on poor political foundations rarely remains good policy
for very long. Bolstering these foundations is a critical challenge for
both public health politics and public health policy.

